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Am I really sure? This is a question not only scientists ask themselves but practically
everybody every day. A recent study provides behavioral evidence supporting the view
that one’s subjective confidence in a decision (i.e., feeling sure that a decision is
correct) is represented in a task-independent format. Previous neuroimaging studies
identified neural correlates of decision confidence but whether or not these are
task-dependent remains unclear. Here, combining two perceptual decision tasks
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we provide neural evidence for
a task-independent representation of degrees of subjective certainty (i.e., a neural
representation of subjective certainty that remains constant across two visual tasks).
Importantly, due to the constant stimulus-intensity used this result is independent of
task-difficulty and stimulus properties. Our data provide strong evidence for a generic
mechanism underlying the computation of subjective perceptual certainty in vision.
Keywords: decision making, confidence, subjective certainty, perception, fMRI
Introduction
Am I really sure? This is a question not only scientists ask themselves but practically everybody
everyday. Shall I get a less interesting but better paying job? Shall I ﬁnally end my annoying
relationship? Or give it another try? These are decisions we make with more or less subjective
certainty. Generally, when we make decisions, we do that with varying degrees of subjective
certainty, or conﬁdence. The mechanisms of the emergence of degrees of subjective certainty have
been investigated in humans for more than a century (e.g., Peirce and Jastrow, 1884; Vickers, 1979;
Fleming et al., 2010, 2012; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Hebart et al., 2014; Zizlsperger et al.,
2014; Gherman and Philiastides, 2015) and more recently in animals (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani
and Shadlen, 2009; Komura et al., 2013).
So far research has mostly focused on process models of certainty (e.g., Peirce and Jastrow,
1884; Vickers, 1979; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Hebart et al., 2014; Gherman and Philiastides,
2015) rather than representational models. While process models describe system dynamics and
computational mechanisms, representation models describe the processing device itself and the
way an entity is represented (such as by a feature list).
An outstanding question on the representational level is how degrees of subjective certainty are
represented on the neural level. For example it may be the case that in two diﬀerent tasks distinct
brain areas represent subjective certainty. In line with this view, Kiani and Shadlen (2009) report
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that choice certainty is computed along with the decision in
sensory-motor neurons in Area LIP, i.e., represented in a task-
speciﬁc fashion. On the other hand, De Gardelle and Mamassian
(2014) provide behavioral evidence supporting the view that
one’s subjective conﬁdence in a decision is represented in a task-
independent format. In this study subjects either performed two
identical or two diﬀerent perceptual task-trials in succession.
After each pair of trials they had to indicate, in which of
the two trials they were more conﬁdent in the correctness of
their decision. The authors reason, that if conﬁdence was task
speciﬁc, then comparing conﬁdence across two diﬀerent tasks
should be harder than comparing conﬁdence across two instances
of the same task. They found no diﬀerence between the two
conditions, supporting the view that conﬁdence is accessed as
an abstract and task-independent quantity. In consequence, as
an alternative hypothesis to the task-speciﬁc representation of
subjective certainty, subjective certainty in diﬀerent tasks could
share a common neural substrate. Previous neuroimaging studies
identiﬁed neural correlates of decision conﬁdence, i.e., the degree
of belief subjects have in the correctness of their choice (e.g.,
Fleming et al., 2012; Hebart et al., 2014). The brain area most
consistently found to code for post decisional conﬁdence in
humans is the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC; Fleck
et al., 2006; Fleming et al., 2012; Hebart et al., 2014). Other
areas reported to carry a conﬁdence signal in humans include
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; Fleck et al., 2006),
the ventral striatum and the right anterior insula (Hebart et al.,
2014) as well as right posterior parietal cortex and bilateral
middle frontal gyrus (MFG; Fleming et al., 2012). Crucially, the
dependence of these neural representations on a particular task
remains unclear. Previous studies couldn’t address this question
because they either only looked at one task at a time (e.g., Fleming
et al., 2012; Hebart et al., 2014), didn’t control for diﬃculty (Fleck
et al., 2006), or were pure behavioral studies (e.g., De Gardelle and
Mamassian, 2014).
The hypothesis we investigate here is, whether there is a
task-independent neural representation of subjective certainty.
We reasoned that in a brain region, to be considered the
neural substrate of a task-independent certainty-representation,
BOLD signal should vary with the degree of subjective certainty,
independent of the kind of task. For this study we therefore
developed a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)-
design combining two tasks, a color and a motion detection
task.
Because most researchers in the ﬁeld are interested in the
relationship between performance and conﬁdence (belief in the
correctness of a choice; for critical treatments of this approach
see Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Drugowitsch et al., 2014) the usual
approach is to calibrate stimulus intensities to predeﬁned levels
of performance. In the experimental trials subjects indicate their
(binary) decision ﬁrst and only then rate their conﬁdence (e.g.,
Fleming et al., 2010; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Fleming et al.,
2012). Crucially, Baranski and Petrusic (2001) report that in
this design conﬁdence processing occurs both parallel to choice
and after choice. In addition, Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) and
Yu et al. (2015) show that in this design subjects continue to
accumulate evidence after choice, so that the conﬁdence ratings
are not based on the same evidence as the decision. Finally,
Boldt and Yeung (2015) report evidence supporting the view that
shared mechanisms underlie post decisional conﬁdence ratings
and post decisional error detection. Therefore, because we were
interested in the degree of certainty leading to choice (and neither
in post decisional conﬁdence nor in error detection) and it’s
neural correlates we ﬂipped the usual response order and asked
for certainty ratings ﬁrst and let subjects only then indicate their
decision. Also, because the quantity of interest here is subjective
certainty, in contrast to previous studies, we calibrated stimulus
intensity to a predeﬁned average level of subjective certainty
instead of performance.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 24 healthy right-handed volunteers with normal
or corrected to normal vision participated in the experiment.
Eligibility was assessed with a general health questionnaire and
an fMRI safety screening form. None had a history of psychiatric
or neurological disorder. Two subjects aborted the experiment
due to dizziness. Two additional subjects were excluded due to
excessive head motion. The latter 2 subjects’ data were used for
behavioral analyses, resulting in a sample of 22 subjects (mean
age = 23.5, min = 20, max = 28, 13 female). (The ﬁnal fMRI
analyses were carried out with data obtained from the remaining
20 subjects (mean age = 23.3, min = 20, max = 28, 11 female).
The study was approved by the local ethics committee at the Freie
Universitaet Berlin, Germany, and carried out in accordance to
the Declaration of Helsinki. All subjects gave informed written
consent before the study.
Stimuli
Participants performed a color-motion-detection-task (see
Figure 1). The dots were blue and red, presented on a black
background and were drawn in a circular aperture for the
duration of one video frame (60 Hz). The dots were redrawn
after ∼50 ms at either a random location or a neighboring
spatial location to induce apparent motion. The resulting motion
eﬀect appeared to move between 3 and 7◦/s, and the dots were
drawn at a density of 16.7 dots per degree/second. For the color
manipulation we used the values from Kayser et al. (2010). The
two values were red: RGB = (255 65 2) and blue: RGB = (5 137
255). A subportion of the dots was assigned the target color while
the rest of the dots was evenly divided between blue and red. The
subset of dots representing the coherent feature (motion and/or
color) was changed from frame to frame so that the subset of
coherent dots on one frame was not the same as the subset of
coherent dots on the previous frame. The task was implemented
using Psychtoolbox-3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al.,
2007). In order to avoid ﬂoor and ceiling eﬀects, previous to
testing stimulus intensities (coherence values) were calibrated to
an average level (2.5 on a scale of 1–4) of subjective certainty in a
subject-speciﬁc manner. The resulting average coherence-levels
were 0.178 (min = 0.14, max = 0.217) for motion and 0.197
(min = 0.137, max = 0.269) for color. These subject-speciﬁc
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FIGURE 1 | Task description. subjects see on the display a cloud of colored
moving dots. In the beginning of each trial they are cued whether to attend
motion and ignore color or attend color and ignore motion. Depending on the
cue after stimulus presentation (750 ms) they have to rate their degree of
certainty that motion was to the left or right or that one color was more present
than the other (blue or red). Only after the certainty rating, they indicate the
respective direction or color. Task modified from Kayser et al. (2010).
stimulus intensities were then held constant throughout the
whole experiment. Subjects indicated their responses using a
four-button-response-box in the right hand (for ratings) and
a two-button-response-box in the left hand (for direction and
color indication). (Current Designs, Philadelphia).
Task
Subjects saw a cloud of colored moving dots. In the beginning
of each trial a verbal cue appeared on the screen (‘color,’
‘motion’) instructing subjects to attend motion and ignore color
or attend color and ignore motion. Depending on the cue,
after stimulus presentation (750 ms) they had to rate their
degree of certainty that the net-motion of a dynamic random
dot stimulus was to the left or right or that the number of
dots in one color was greater than the number of dots in the
other color (blue or red). After the rating subjects indicated the
respective direction or color. [See Figure 1, Task modiﬁed from
Kayser et al. (2010)]. Note that we ﬂipped the usual order of
response prompts, that is we asked for certainty-ratings ﬁrst and
only then let subjects indicate their binary choice. To minimize
switch cost trial types were presented in Blocks of 16 trials.
Block order was counterbalanced across runs and subjects. All
subjects completed 5 runs of 64 trials in a pseudorandomized
fashion.
Behavioral Analysis
To analyze the eﬀect of certainty and task on RT we speciﬁed a
linear mixed model. For the analysis of eﬀects of conﬁdence and
task on performance we used a generalized linear mixed model.
In both analyses we followed an information theoretic approach
via AIC comparison. To arrive at the minimum adequate model
we compared a (1) full model including conﬁdence, RT and their
interaction term with 3 reduced models: (2) without interaction
term, (3) only conﬁdence term, (4) only task term.
fMRI Data-acquisition
Whole-brain functional and anatomical images were acquired
using a 3.0 T Magnetom TrioTim MRI scanner (Siemens,
Erlangen, Germany) and a 12-channel head coil. A high-
resolution 3D T1-weighted dataset was recorded for each
participant (176 sagittal sections, 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm; 256
matrix × 256 matrix). Functional images were acquired using a
T2∗- weighted, gradient-echo echo planar imaging (EPI) pulse
sequence recording 37 axial slices (no gap) for whole brain
coverage at an in-plane resolution of 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm
(TE = 30 ms; TR = 2 s; FA = 70◦; FoV = 192 mm × 192 mm;
64 matrix × 64 matrix). A total of 290 whole-brain volumes were
recorded for each of ﬁve experimental runs of ∼10 min each.
fMRI-preprocessing
Data quality was checked using ArtRepair1. Bad slices (scanner-
artifacts due to Radiofrequency-coil ﬂuctuations) were detected
when the amount of data scattered outside the head (in a slice) is
at least T (here default, T = 5) above the average amount of data
scattered outside the head in the corresponding slices of the best
two of the ﬁrst three volumes.
Bad slices were replaced by a linear interpolation of the
corresponding slices in the before and after volume. In addition
data were despiked and outlier-volumes replaced by interpolating
between the nearest intact volumes. For a discussion of the
applied data quality check methods, please refer to Mazaika et al.
(2009). We performed all analyses using MATLAB (Mathworks,
Natick, MA, USA), SPM82, and R3. fMRI data were preprocessed
using standard procedures in SPM8. EPI images were realigned,
coregistered to the respective participant’s T1 scan, segmented,
normalized to a standard T1 template based on the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain, resampled to 3 mm
isotropic voxels, and spatially smoothed with an isotropic 8 mm
full width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian Kernel.
fMRI-analysis
At the ﬁrst level, we regressed fMRI time series onto a general
linear model (GLM) containing stick functions representing the
onset of the stimulus. Separate regressors aligned to stimulus
onset modeled color and motion trials, each parametrically
(linear) modulated by the reported certainty rating. Regressors
were convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic response
function (HRF). Motion correction parameters were entered
as regressors of no interest and we applied a high-pass ﬁlter
(128 s cutoﬀ) to exclude low-frequency drifts. First-level contrast
images were entered into a second-level ANOVA. The analysis
included four ﬁrst-level contrast images (positive and negative
parametric eﬀects of certainty in color and motion trials) from
1http://cibsr.stanford.edu/tools/human-brain-project/artrepair-software.html
2http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
3https://www.r-project.org/
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each participant. We then performed conjunction analyses (test
of conjunction null hypothesis, i.e., logical AND) on the two
positive and on the two negative parametric eﬀects. All reported
changes in BOLD signal survive p < 0.05, Family-wise-error
(FWE) -corrected, at the cluster level for multiple comparisons
using a cluster-deﬁning threshold of p< 0.001, uncorrected.
To further specify the relation between rating-level and
changes in BOLD signal, we speciﬁed an additional model. Here
instead of using the rating level as a parametric modulator of one
regressor, wemodeled each rating level using a separate regressor.
This allowed us to compute percent BOLD signal change for each
rating level (e.g., Figure 5).
Results
Behavior
Subjects were correct on 80.57% (±14.99) of motion trials
and 74.22% (±15.69) of color trials. Mean conﬁdence-
ratings were 2.67 (±0.25) in motion trials and 2.65 (±0.38)
in color trials. Mean reaction times were 0.84 s (±0.35)
in motion trials and 0.88 s (±0.36) in color trials. For
the relationship between certainty, task and RT we found
that a reduced model with certainty but without task as
predictor and without interaction term (AIC = 7515.7)
was superior to all other models. (AIC full = 7532.851,
AIC task = 8495.642, AIC task + certainty = 7518.444,
also see Table 1). For the relationship between certainty,
task and performance a diﬀerent reduced model (with
certainty and task as predictors but without interaction
term; AIC = 6512.2) was superior to all other models (AIC
full = 6514.8, AIC certainty = 6551.9, AIC task = 6725.8).
(See Table 1 for details of the winning model and Figure 1).
Given that we calibrated with respect to conﬁdence and not
to performance this latter result is to be expected. We further
checked whether relationships between RT, subjective certainty
and performance as expected based on the literature were
present in our data. As expected, average task performance
was higher for high (rating = 4 = ‘certain’) subjective
certainty (color: mean = 0.8518; motion: mean = 0.885)
TABLE 1 | Minimum adequate model for RT and performance as
dependent variable.
Log RT as dependent
variable
Performance as
dependent variable
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Intercept −0.12 0.05 0.39 0.2
Certainty 2 0.05 0.02 0.4 0.06
Certainty 3 −0.17 0.02 0.5 0.097
Certainty 4 −0.44 0.02 1.1 0.097
Task 2 − − 1.47 0.12
The minimum adequate model for RT has only confidence as a predictor, while the
model for performance additionally includes task (color or motion) as a predictor.
Intercept: mean log RT (respectively, performance) for certainty rating 1 in task 1.
Certainty 2–4: increasing certainty ratings.
than for low (rating = 1 = ‘uncertain’) certainty trials [color:
mean = 0.5991, paired t-test t(21) = −5.777, p = 0.00000982;
motion: mean = 0.6546, t(21) = −6.0991, p = 0.000004725]
while average reaction times decreased with increasing
certainty (color trials: mean r = −0.3357 ± 0.234 SD;
motion trials: mean r = −0.3265 ± 0.1799 SD; Figure 2).
Also as expected, RTs were on average longer in error-
trials (color mean = 0.9272, motion mean = 0.9565)
than in correct trials [color mean = 0.8723; paired t-test,
t(21) = −2.2647, p = 0.03424, motion mean = 0.8283,
paired t-test, t(21) = −4.0415, p = 0.0006]. Choice-RTs
(time between rating and decision) were also longer in
error trials (color mean = 0.5446, motion mean = 0.5309)
than in correct trials [color mean = 0.4893, paired t-test,
t(21) = −3.8453, p = 0.00094; motion mean = 0.4455, paired
t-test, t(21) = −3.8423, p = 0.00095].
In particular, we wondered whether subject-speciﬁc calibrated
stimulus intensities were related to mean performance but
FIGURE 2 | Relation between subjective certainty ratings,
performance, and reaction time. Performance increases with subjective
certainty while RT decreases (see also Results section and Table 1).
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found no signiﬁcant correlation (color trials: r = 0.2516,
p = 0.2587; motion trials: r = −0.0036, p = 0.9857). The
same was the case for the relation between calibrated stimulus
intensities and rating-RT (color trials: r = −0.0616, p = 0.7854;
motion trials: r = 0.2767, p = 0.2126) as well as between
intensities and subjective certainty (color trials: r = −0.4047,
p = 0.0617; motion trials: r = −0.2720, p = 0.2207). We
found that calibrated color andmotion intensities were correlated
across subjects (r = 0.4771, p = 0.0248), suggesting that
we calibrated to a dimension that is shared by the color
and the motion task. Also, choice-RT, i.e., the time between
choice-screen onset and choice displayed a signiﬁcant negative
correlation with performance in color trials (r = −0.5053,
p = 0.0164) but not in motion trials (r = −0.2910,
p = 0.1889).
Finally, we performed a pairwise comparison of the standard
deviations of the certainty-ratings in the two tasks but found no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence [t(21) = 1.885, p = 0.073].
fMRI-results
Unless indicated otherwise all changes in BOLD signal
are reported at a cluster-deﬁning threshold of p < 0.001
(uncorrected) and family wise error (FWE) corrected for
multiple comparisons at p< 0.05.
Color trials: In the color task we found a positive parametric
eﬀect of subjective certainty in the right lingual, calcarine,
fusiform, and left angular gyrus. We found a negative
parametric eﬀect of certainty in the supplementary motor
area (SMA) within DMPFC, superior frontal gyrus (SFG),
lingual gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), Insula, and
inferior parietal lobule. (See Table 2 for a full list of
activations).
Motion trials: In the motion task we found a positive
parametric eﬀect of subjective certainty in the angular,
calcarine, lingual, and fusiform gyrus, middle orbital
gyrus within the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
and posterior cingulate cortex. We found a negative
parametric eﬀect of certainty in SMA/DMPFC, SFG, lingual
gyrus, fusiform gyrus, precuneus, superior parietal lobule,
inferior parietal lobule, and IFG (p. triangularis). (See
Table 3).
Conjunction null: Testing the Conjunction null (logical
AND) for the positive parametric eﬀects we found two
signiﬁcant clusters. The ﬁrst was centered in the right
calcarine gyrus extending into the right lingual gyrus and
the right fusiform gyrus. The second one was located in
the left angular gyrus (see Table 4). Testing the Conjunction
TABLE 2 | Areas showing significant correlations with subjective certainty ratings in color trials (cluster-defining threshold p < 0.001, uncorrected;
reported changes in BOLD signal corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05, whole brain corrected).
Region Voxels at p < 0.001 Peak t-score P (cluster FWE corrected) Peak voxel MNI coordinates
Positive correlations
Lingual gyr (r) 339 5.84 <0.001 21, −70, −8
Calcarine gyr (r) 5.19 18, −82, 4
Fusiform gyr (r) 4.36 30, −67, −5
Angular gyr (l) 83 4.77 <0.019 −45, −76, 28
Negative correlations
DMPFC/SMA (l/r) 1604 7.49 <0.001 −9, 11, 49
Sup front gyr (l) 6.4 −24, −4, 52
Postcentral gyr (l) 6.29 −42, −19, 52
Lingual gyr (l) 157 6.57 <0.001 −12, −88, −5
Inf occipital gyr (l) 3.9 −33, −88, −11
3.6 −24, −91, −14
Inf front gyr (l) 260 5.43 <0.001 −45, 14, 1
4.27 −51, 26, 28
Insula (l) 4.08 −30, 29, 4
Inf pariet lobule (r) 165 4.71 <0.001 36, −43, 52
Supramarginal gyrus (r) 3.73 33, −40, 43
Sup pariet lobule (r) 3.65 42, −31, 31
Insula (r) 82 4.43 <0.003 45, 14, −2
4.37 33, 17, 4
Inf front gyr (r) 3.66 54, 17, 10
Precuneus (r) 69 4.24 <0.005 12, −64, 52
Middle front gyr (r) 95 3.99 <0.001 33, 38, 28
Middle front gyr (r) 3.75 27, 47, 28
Inf front gyr (r) 3.67 51, 29, 28
FWE, family wise error; l, left; r, right; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; SMA, supplementary motor area; DMPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, inf, inferior; sup,
superior; pariet, parietal; front, frontal; gyr, gyrus, lob, lobule.
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TABLE 3 | Areas showing significant correlations with subjective certainty ratings in motion trials (cluster-defining threshold p < 0.001, uncorrected;
reported changes in BOLD signal corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05, whole brain corrected).
Region Voxels at p < 0.001 Peak t-score P (cluster FWE corrected) Peak voxel MNI coordinates
Positive correlations
Angular gyr (l) 173 6.06 <0.001 −45, −70, 25
Inf pariet gyr (l) 5.3 −48, −73, 37
Calcarine gyr (r) 370 5.79 <0.001 15, −85, 1
Lingual gyr (r) 5.00 12, −76, −8
Fusiform gyr (r) 4.98 24, −73, −11
vmPFC (l/r) 562 5.74 <0.001 −3, 44, −11
5.00 3, 35, −11
Rectal gyr (l/r) 4.57 −3, 44, −20
Posterior cingulate (l) 267 5.5 <0.001 −9, −52, 31
4.55 −15, −52, 13
Calcarine gyr (l) 3.83 −6, −52, 7
Negative correlations
SMA/DMPFC (l/r) 1970 7.09 <0.0001 −6, 8, 49
6.04 21, 5, 67
Sup Front gyr (r) 6.01 24, 2, 58
Lingual gyr (l) 116 5.32 <0.004 −12, −88, −5
4.69 −15, −85, −14
Fusiform gyr (l) 4.33 −24, −76, −8
Precuneus (r) 167 5.26 <0.001 9, −64, 49
4.81 15, −76, 55
Sup pariet lob 3.73 18, −64, 61
Inf pariet lob (r) 212 4.7 <0.0001 39, −43, 46
5.56 36, −49, 52
4.14 33, −43, 37
Inf front gyr (l) 83 4.28 <0.019 −51, 29, 25
vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
TABLE 4 | Conjunction: areas showing task-independent significant correlations with subjective certainty ratings in both color and motion trials.
Region Voxels at p < 0.001 Peak t-score P (cluster FWE corrected) Peak voxel MNI coordinates
Positive correlations
Calcarine gyr (r) 232 5.18 <0.001 18, −82, 4
Lingual gyr (r) 4.98 15, −76, −8
Fusiform gyr (r) 4.98 24, −73, −11
Angular gyr (l) 72 4.77 <0.032 −45, −76, 28
Negative correlations
DMPFC (l/r) 1133 7.09 <0.001 −6, 8, 49
Postcentral gyr (l) 5.67 −48, −19, 55
SMA (r) 5.6 15, 11, 67
Lingual gyr (l) 78 5.32 <0.024 −12, −88, −5
Insula (r) 68 4.37 <0.04 33, 17, 4
4.37 45, 14, −2
Inf front gyr (r) 3.66 54, 17, 10
Inf pariet lob (r) 84 4.24 <0.018 39, −43, 52
Inf pariet cortex (r) 3.48 39, −31, 37
Supramarg gyr (r) 3.41 54, −34, 46
Cluster-defining threshold p < 0.001, uncorrected; reported changes in BOLD signal corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05, whole brain corrected.
null of the certainty activation maps in both trial-types for
the negative parametric eﬀects we found four signiﬁcant
clusters.
The ﬁrst and biggest was centered in DMPFC extending from
left SMA into the left postcentral gyrus and right SMA. The others
were located at left lingual gyrus, right insula, extending into right
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IFG (p. opercularis) and right inferior parietal lobule extending
into the right supramarginal gyrus (see Table 4). For an overview
of positive and negative parametric eﬀects see Figures 3 and 4,
respectively.
Control analysis: To exclude the possibility that our main
conjunction-results were biased by the rating-distribution we
performed a conﬁrmatory analysis with homogenized rating-
frequencies. We randomly selected trials so that for each rating-
level we used the same amount of trials. We performed this
analysis within a mask generated from the contrasts from
the previous parametric whole brain analysis (initial threshold
p < 0.001, with heterogeneous rating-distributions). As not all
subjects used all rating levels in all runs, for this model we did
the following: If a subject in at least one run didn’t use rating
level 1 (uncertain) or 2 (rather uncertain) we collapsed these two
rating levels. If a subject in at least one run didn’t use rating level
3 (rather certain) or 4 (certain) we collapsed these two rating
levels. We conﬁrmed all our main results (although the exact
peak-coordinates diﬀer slightly, compare Tables 4 and 5) for the
conjunction of the positive parametric eﬀects (see Table 5).
For the conjunction of negative parametric eﬀects we
conﬁrmed our frontal and occipital activations, but couldn’t
conﬁrm the right insular and right parietal cluster (see Table 5).
We wondered whether this was due to the diﬀerent rating
distribution or due to the reduced trial-number [and therefore a
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) issue]. We reasoned, that if changes
in BOLD signal, although non-signiﬁcant, followed the same
FIGURE 3 | Overview of positive parametric effects in color (yellow) and motion (blue) trials and their conjunction (green). (A) Lateral view of left
Hemisphere, (B) Medial view of left Hemisphere, (C) Dorsal view, (D) Lateral view of right Hemisphere, and (E) Medial view of right Hemisphere. See Tables 2–4 for
details.
FIGURE 4 | Overview of negative parametric effects in color (yellow) and motion (blue) trials and their conjunction (green). (A) Lateral view of left
Hemisphere, (B) Medial view of left Hemisphere, (C) Dorsal view, (D) Lateral view of right Hemisphere, and (E) Medial view of right Hemisphere. See Tables 2–4 for
details.
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TABLE 5 | Conjunction: areas showing task-independent significant correlations with subjective certainty ratings in both color and motion trials.
Region Voxels at p < 0.001 Peak t-score P (cluster FWE corrected) Peak voxel MNI coordinates
Positive correlations
Calcarine gyr (r) 143 4.43 <0.001 15, −85, 1
Fusiform gyr (r) 4.39 24, −70, −8
Lingual gyr (r) 4.39 15, −79, −8
Angular gyr (l) 33 4.26 <0.003 −45, −76, 34
Negative correlations
DMPFC/ SMA 86 5.42 <0.011 −6, 14, 49
3.38 6, 20, 61
Calcarine gyr (l) 28 5.14 <0.017 −9, −88, −2
Lingual gyr (l) 3.73 −12, −82, −14
Postcentral gyr (l) 41 4.6 <0.007 −45, −19, 52
Sup front gyr (r) 74 4.52 <0.001 21, 5, 64
4.51 24, 5, 52
SMA (r) 3.93 15, 11, 67
Sup front gyr (l) 26 4.52 <0.02 −21, −4, 52
Rating frequencies are homogenized and the contrast is masked by the significant clusters obtained from the unhomogenized conjunction (see Table 3; cluster-defining
threshold p < 0.001, uncorrected; reported changes in BOLD signal corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05, small volume corrected).
trend (i.e., higher betas for lower conﬁdence) we would consider
this an SNR-issue. For this purpose we speciﬁed an additional
model, where we modeled trials associated with a speciﬁc
rating level using separate regressors and extracted betas at
the previously found peak coordinates in the insular cluster
(xyz = 33, 17, 4) and the inferior parietal cluster (xyz = 39, −43,
52; see Figure 5). Both areas showed a negative parametric trend
of certainty so we consider these diﬀerences in the results of the
two models (heterogeneous vs. homogenized rating frequencies)
to be due to SNR rather than the altered rating distribution.
In an additional control analysis we limited our analysis to
correct trials only. Again, we conﬁrmed all our main results (see
Table 6). For further discussion we limit ourselves to changes in
BOLD signal that were consistent across tasks and models.
Discussion
It is an outstanding question to what extent the neural
computation of degrees of subjective certainty is task-speciﬁc.
Here, we show that a substantial part of the neural representation
of degrees of subjective perceptual certainty is task-invariant.
We found that in two diﬀerent tasks changes in BOLD signal
increased with subjective certainty in the right lingual, calcarine,
and left angular gyrus; BOLD signal decreased with increasing
subjective certainty in the left lingual Gyrus, right inferior parietal
lobule, bilateral DMPFC/SMA, and left postcentral gyrus. These
changes in BOLD signal were virtually identical in the two tasks.
Our data therefore support the view, that there is a central module
in the brain processing subjective certainty and that, consistent
with De Gardelle and Mamassian (2014), degrees of subjective
certainty are represented in a task-independent format. This
supports the notion of a generic neural mechanism underlying
the computation of certainty.
Similarity to an deviations from other studies’ results: The
observed conjunction eﬀects in DMPFC (−6, 8, 49, MNI
coordinates of peak voxel) were located closely to conﬁdence-
related changes in BOLD signal reported by Fleck et al. (2006;
−11, 15, 49), Hebart et al. (2014; −9, 15, 54), and (Fleming et al.,
2012; −3, 14, 46), stressing the robustness of this ﬁnding. In
our motion condition we largely replicate the conﬁdence-related
ﬁndings by Hebart et al. (2014) who also used a direction-
of-motion discrimination task. Importantly, however, we could
not replicate these results in the color task, although we kept
everything but the instruction cue constant across the two tasks.
One possible explanation for this observation is that variability
in certainty-ratings may be lower in the color task than in
the motion task. We performed a pairwise comparison of the
standard deviations of the certainty-ratings in the two tasks but
found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. This suggests that diﬀerences in
the activation pattern between the two tasks are genuine. Also,
we did not ﬁnd the positive parametric eﬀect of certainty in
the striatum reported by Schwarze et al. (2013) or Hebart et al.
(2014). Regarding the role of the ventral striatum in conﬁdence
processing there are two noteworthy recent reports: Daniel
and Pollmann (2012) found a positive parametric relationship
between prediction error on conﬁdence and striatal activation.
Whenever conﬁdence was higher than could be expected from
previous trials, striatal activation was also higher, indicating a
role of the striatum in coding changes in conﬁdence (rather
than coding conﬁdence itself). Schwarze et al. (2013) reported
that the striatum contributes to conﬁdence processing when the
task at hand is very diﬃcult. Using an ‘unusually diﬃcult’ task
characterized by low levels of both conﬁdence and accuracy
Schwarze et al. (2013) observed a positive correlation between
conﬁdence and changes in activity in the ventral striatum. The
authors explain their ﬁnding in terms of reward: Humans are
typically uncertainty averse (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Hirsh
et al., 2012). When diﬃculty is high and in consequence high-
conﬁdence trials rare, the subjective value of high conﬁdent
decisions is expected to be higher than usual, i.e., subjects might
experience the infrequent high conﬁdence trials as rewarding.
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FIGURE 5 | (A) BOLD signal change in Insula (xyz = 33, 17, 4), heterogeneous rating frequencies. (B) BOLD signal change in Insula, homogenized rating
frequencies (C) BOLD signal change in inferior parietal lobule (xyz = 39, −43, 52), heterogeneous rating frequencies. (D) BOLD signal change in inferior parietal
lobule, homogenized rating frequencies.
TABLE 6 | Conjunction: Areas showing task-independent significant correlations with subjective certainty ratings in both color and motion trials.
Region Voxels at p < 0.001 Peak t-score P (cluster FWE corrected) Peak voxel MNI coordinates
Positive correlations
Calcarine gyr (r) 147 5.23 <0.001 21, −82, 4
Lingual gyr (r) 4.84 15, −73, −8
Angular gyr (l) 14 3.67 <0.014 −42, −70, 37
Negative correlations
DMPFC/ SMA (l) 365 5.35 <0.001 −6, 11, 49
SMA (r) 4.89 15, 11, 67
Postcentr gyr (l) 36 4.82 <0.012 −45, −19, 52
Inf pariet lob (r) 20 4.29 <0.036 36, −46, 52
lingual gyr (l) 17 4.08 <0.046 −12, −88, −5
Inf pariet lob (l) 40 3.68 <0.01 −36, −43, 46
Here only correct trials are modeled and the contrast is masked by the significant clusters obtained from the ‘main’- conjunction (see Table 3; cluster-defining threshold
p < 0.001, uncorrected; reported changes in BOLD signal corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05, small volume corrected).
Combining these two ﬁndings it appears that the striatum signals
when conﬁdence is higher than expected and that this prediction
error is experienced as rewarding.
As detailed in the next section, possible explanations for
diﬀerences between the results of our study and those of
earlier studies may be found in the details of the respective
experimental designs: Relevant factors may be (a) the quantity
kept constant, (b) the precise question (performance or stimulus-
related) subjects are asked, (c) the time conﬁdence is rated, and
(d) whether feedback or reward were provided.
Depending on the goal of a conﬁdence/certainty – study
mainly two strategies have been used: either keep the stimulus
constant or keep performance constant (e.g., using a staircase
procedure). Researchers interested in subjects’ introspective
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FIGURE 6 | (A) BOLD signal change in right lingual gyrus, (B) BOLD signal
change in left lingual gyrus. Areas show opposite patterns. While BOLD signal
in right lingual gyrus shows a positive correlation, BOLD signal in left lingual
gyrus shows a negative correlation with subjective certainty ratings.
ability to evaluate their performance (e.g., Lau and Passingham,
2006; Fleming et al., 2012), usually use staircase-methods to
keep performance constant throughout the whole experiment
(because they are interested in the relation between conﬁdence
and performance). This implies that stimulus values vary. Others,
like us in the present study, are interested in the relation between
stimulus and conﬁdence, so we calibrated stimulus intensities to a
predeﬁned level of conﬁdence (and not to a level of performance),
and keep this stimulus level constant throughout the experiment.
This implies that performance may vary.
Researchers interested in subjects’ introspective ability to
evaluate their performance (e.g., Lau and Passingham, 2006;
Fleming et al., 2012), usually use performance-related ratings
(because they are interested in the relation between conﬁdence
and performance). That is: subjects rate how conﬁdent they
are that their decision was correct. We asked subjects for their
subjective certainty with regard to the stimulus. So we asked a
diﬀerent question. While the usual performance-related question
(“How conﬁdent are you that your decision was correct?”) is
primarily concerned with introspection and metacognition, the
stimulus-related question (“How certain are you with regard
to the stimulus identity?”) is of a more epistemic nature. It is
concerned with the subject’s estimation of the ‘here and now’
(Komura et al., 2013) and importantly in their belief in their
percept of the world.
In most recent studies subjects are asked to indicate their
decision and after a forced delay indicate their degree of
certainty that their decision was correct. If the primary target of
investigation is choice certainty, the degree of subjective certainty
associated with (i.e., directly preceding) the actual choice, this
is problematic. Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) show, that in a
perceptual task evidence accumulation continues after choice, so
that post-decisional conﬁdence ratings are not based on the same
evidence underlying choice. Therefore we ﬂipped the response-
order of decision and rating and asked subjects for the rating
ﬁrst, that is before they indicated their decision. We reasoned
that already during the decision process there should be a graded
certainty signal (as recently shown by Gherman and Philiastides
(2015).
In contrast to animal studies most studies of conﬁdence in
humans do not give feedback or oﬀer reward. However, some
give feedback during training (e.g., Hebart et al., 2014) which
may still aﬀect neural processes in the main experiment. Varying
these four factors (quantity kept constant, performance- vs.
stimulus-related question, time of rating, and feedback/reward)
in a systematic and independent fashion could shed light on the
origins of the observed diﬀerences in experimental results.
One possible shortcoming of this study is that variations in
certainty might partially be due to ﬂuctuations in attention.
However, it has been shown (Macdonald et al., 2011) that
attention and conﬁdence, although they are both related to
performance, are not necessarily correlated. In addition, although
we held stimulus information constant, there are ﬂuctuations
in the momentary evidence, which may partially explain the
observed variation in subjective certainty at an otherwise ﬁxed
stimulus-level [For eﬀects of the temporal distribution of
evidence on conﬁdence see Zylberberg et al. (2012)]. However,
this doesn’t aﬀect that mean-coherence, and therefore average
information available to the subject, was constant.
In the present study we asked subjects for their perceptual
certainty before choice and we observed a parametric modulation
of BOLD signal by certainty-ratings already during stimulus
presentation. Using EEG, Gherman and Philiastides (2015)
showed that a conﬁdence-signal, which could not be explained
by stimulus diﬃculty or performance, emerges as early as
the decision process itself. Similar results were obtained by
Zizlsperger et al. (2014) showing that a perceptual conﬁdence-
signal, which is dissociable from representations of sensory
evidence and performance, is present as early as 300 ms
after stimulus onset. The temporal aspect of these results
clearly challenges the generality of the metacognitive account
of conﬁdence/certainty. According to this account (e.g., Nelson,
1990; Fleming et al., 2010), conﬁdence is modeled as the result
of a noisy read-out of a decision variable. This model therefore
excludes the existence of ‘pre-decision-conﬁdence’ as observed by
us and Gherman and Philiastides (2015). The existing literature
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makes it unlikely that conﬁdence is a purely post-decisional
process. Its processing might either start pre-decisionally or
alternatively, pre- and post- decisional certainty processing may
serve diﬀerent purposes and may be based on partially diﬀerent
mechanisms. While pre-decision certainty is associated with
incoming evidence and the actual decision process, post-decision
conﬁdence may be best viewed as an error-detection-signal (Boldt
and Yeung, 2015) and, as suggested by Hebart et al. (2014),
provide a learning signal in the absence of feedback. Whether
this signal is metacognitive in nature and the result of a noisy
read-out of the decision variable at the time of choice is unclear.
Yu et al. (2015) report compelling evidence for post-decisional
processing of conﬁdence. Speciﬁcally, they show that with longer
forced delays between decision and rating the resolution of the
conﬁdence-accuracy relationship increases. While conﬁdence in
correct responses stays relatively stable over diﬀerent forced-
delay durations, conﬁdence in incorrect responses decreases with
increasing forced delay durations. This is in line with research
on the link between decision conﬁdence and error detection
(Macdonald et al., 2011; Boldt and Yeung, 2015) and at the same
time challenges the metacognitive account of conﬁdence. Further
research and a formal comparison of process models are needed
to shed light on this issue.
In the present study even when in addition to the stimulus,
performance was held constant, we still observe parametric
eﬀects of certainty (see Table 6). This indicates that the processes
we observe here are not directly performance-related. The
observation of stimulus- and performance-independent certainty
signals in our study and reported above (Zizlsperger et al.,
2014; Gherman and Philiastides, 2015) is further supported
by McSorley et al. (2014). They report eye-tracking-evidence
for the claim that in perceptual decision making, decision
and conﬁdence are based on diﬀerent information sources or
processing mechanisms. In line with this dissociability, Vlassova
et al. (2014) show that unconscious information changes decision
accuracy but not conﬁdence. The dissociability of performance-
and conﬁdence-related processes gets further support from the
animal literature: Komura et al. (2013) report that silencing of
the pulvinar nucleus decreased monkeys’ conﬁdence without
aﬀecting performance. Similarly, Lak et al. (2014) found that
orbitofrontal cortex inactivation disrupts conﬁdence processing
without aﬀecting decision accuracy. However, Fetsch et al.
(2014) report opposing results suggesting that the same neural
signals support choice, reaction time, and conﬁdence in a
decision. Taken together the aforementioned ﬁndings indicate
that behavioral conﬁdence and performance do not necessarily
go hand in hand. On the neural level the picture is more
complex: Komura et al. (2013), Fetsch et al. (2014), and
Lak et al. (2014) recorded or manipulated neural activity
at diﬀerent sites (LIP, pulvinar thalamic nucleus, and OFC).
Taken together, their results suggest that within the brain
network processing conﬁdence and performance, some nodes
may represent conﬁdence and performance jointly (e.g., LIP),
while other nodes represent these quantities separately (e.g.,
pulvinar and OFC). This view accommodates the observations,
that on the one hand conﬁdence and performance are usually
correlated, and that on the other hand there are instances in
which they are not.
One particularly interesting observation is that we ﬁnd
both, areas showing a positive and areas showing a negative
task-independent parametric eﬀect of subjective certainty (see
Figure 6 for an example). While some authors only report
negative parametric eﬀects (e.g., Fleming et al., 2012), others
report both (Hebart et al., 2014) but focus on regions displaying
a positive parametric eﬀect of conﬁdence. The usual claim is, that
either areas showing a positive eﬀect or areas showing a negative
eﬀect represent conﬁdence proper.
In our view the co-observation of these eﬀects raises an
intriguing alternative explanation: Imagine the brain is in a
very high (or very low) activity state. A simple one-directional
mechanism where certainty is computed in a way that increasing
certainty is associated with increasing neural activity, would loose
its calibration or better, its capability to adequately code certainty.
If alternatively, certainty (as observed here) is computed in
an interplay of increases and decreases in neural activity, the
baseline state of brain activity is largely canceled out and the
mechanism preserves its calibration. Also, a mechanism where
certainty computation is realized by one principle alone is
vulnerable and therefore prone to error. In contrast, a mechanism
where certainty is computed in parallel (i.e., redundantly) and
in several diﬀerent ways would be very robust against system
perturbation.
Finally, our results not only shed light on the neural
representation of subjective certainty but by showing evidence
for task-independence of certainty-processing also legitimize a
broader and more general interpretation of previous studies
of certainty. However, further research is needed to clarify the
generalizability of our ﬁndings to auditory and somatosensory
settings, as well as to non-perceptual tasks.
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